The Q&A: "Spending targets need to be accompanied by very clear capability targets"

Defense analyst Minna Ålander on the substance and the noise in a historic year for NATO

Minna Ålander

Minna Ålander is an Associate Fellow at Britain’s Chatham House think tank, a Non-resident Fellow at the Atlantic-spanning Centre for European Policy Analysis, and a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. I’ve been reading her on Substack, where her Northern Flank Notes newsletter concentrates on security issues in the Nordic and Baltic countries, and where she’s started a European security channel on historian Phillips O’Brien’s popular Substack.

Events have given her a lot to write about. June’s NATO Summit in The Hague set higher military spending targets for all member states, a change that will play out in Canadian politics for years. The UK and France have started to coordinate their nuclear weapons policy, an amazing bit of cooperation in the most sensitive area of each country’s defense policy. The 30-nation “Coalition of the Willing,” comprising the countries that are at least rhetorically ready to increase military assistance to Ukraine, had yet another organizational meeting last week, for whatever that’s worth. And NATO’s secretary general has been lavishing praise on Donald Trump, the wiggly tooth in the whole North Atlantic alliance.

There’s a lot going on in North Atlantic military security, a file where the attention of Canadians and their governments can be spotty. Ålander has thoughts on all of it. She’s from northern Finland and she seems to work everywhere, but temperamentally she’s from Missouri: grand pronouncements matter less than results, and in an era of turbulence for Ukraine, Europe and the transatlantic alliance, the results will be worth watching. Including, she says at the end of our conversation, when it comes to any claims for a new era in Canadian foreign affairs.

I interviewed Minna Ålander on Friday. This transcript has been edited for length and clarity. I’ve added links here and there to articles that will make useful background reading; the pieces I’ve selected are illustrative, and shouldn’t be taken as representing Ålander’s point of view.

I’ve also organized all my Q&A posts, which are becoming a feature of this newsletter, as a separate channel on my homepage using the hashtag Q&A. If you like this one, now you’ll be able to find the rest.

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Paul Wells: It's been a busy summer. We're very preoccupied in Canada with the NATO spending increases because it has a big impact on our domestic politics. But I was struck by a piece you wrote where you said that you see those spending targets as a bit of a distraction. How come?

Minna Ålander: It's not necessarily the smart thing to focus on the amount of money that is being spent. From a European perspective, if there was a way to make sure that Europeans keep distracted and lose sight of the real goal — which is becoming capable independently of the U.S. — then this would be the best way to do it: setting a spending target instead of capability targets. If the focus is mostly on the amount that is spent, then that creates the wrong incentive structure. Countries are then going to prioritize big-ticket items and not necessarily improve their cooperation in the procurement and production fields. Also, not every country necessarily needs to spend this amount of money. Some may need to spend more, others less. I just think that this is not the smartest way to go about what we need to get done in Europe.

PW: So, the biggest problems in Europe are duplication of effort, and often a lack of will. Essentially 30 different decisions to end up doing nothing. And a gain would be made if you reduce that duplication rather than simply increasing the quantum?

Ålander: Yes, we have a problem with a lot of small national industries that are competing with each other. The defense market is not like a free market in the sense that other goods are, though. Still, there's a lot of inefficiency in the defense market, too, and traditionally joint procurement, and joint production, have been incredibly inefficient in every way, both in terms of lead times and costs. These are the issues that we need to tackle. We need to make sure that cooperation works better and we need to reduce those inefficiencies, and our protectionist tendencies. I honestly don't think that a spending target is going to help with that. Spending targets are also very likely to have an inflationary effect: companies just smell a huge pile of money and then, all of a sudden, everything costs a little more.

PW: Is there a leader in Europe who understands this and is pushing against it?

Ålander: Well, I think it's mainly Spain, but for the wrong reasons. I believe Spain was the least eager to commit to the spending target. Their argument was that they believe that they can reach the capability targets with a different amount of money, which may be true. In the Spanish case, as I understand it, the problem is mainly just that the domestic politics doesn't really allow for this kind of investment in defense at the expense of other things. Spain got a lot of ire from other European countries and had to then make some kind of a commitment of investment. There's a strong consensus in Europe that we need to at least make a lip-service commitment to this in order to pacify Trump and to make sure that NATO makes it through this summit. I understand that logic, and [spending targets] may have been the best play in this situation. Going forward, though, spending targets need to be accompanied by very clear capability targets.

PW: You did write about a substantial breakthrough in cross-border cooperation between France and the UK who have agreed to coordinate their nuclear arsenals. Could you talk about that?

Ålander: This is maybe the most underappreciated news item this week. It should have made much bigger headlines. I think the fact that France agreed to this kind of arrangement with the Brits is literally a revolutionary move for France. France has always had this strictly sovereign nuclear policy and doctrine. France is the only country in NATO that is not part of the nuclear sharing arrangements and doesn't participate in the nuclear planning group, which is a coordination mechanism within NATO. This agreement with the UK is a huge step for France, and in that sense also for all of Europe.

President Trump has induced existential insecurity into all of these nuclear sharing arrangements by introducing all kinds of conditions to who gets to be under that nuclear umbrella and who doesn't. Already, before the elections in January 2024, he said that he would only defend those allies who spend the minimum of 2%. This is intrinsically linked to this whole percentage debate. I think that one of the problems of this focus on what is the spending percentage of GDP is that it's so arbitrary. And any day, Trump can come up with a new number. Will we always just keep jumping over the stick wherever he holds it?

This is why it's so important that Europe is taking these very concrete steps. France and the UK have limited — both of them about 300 warheads each — which is way less than what the US has. But the idea is to make the best of what we have here in Europe, and make sure that it's credible and convincing enough so that Russia will definitely think twice before entertaining any bad ideas about being able to attack European countries with impunity like it did Ukraine. If you look at the global situation and the likelihood of nuclear proliferation that has, unfortunately, significantly risen recently — and Trump is one accelerating factor in this development — Europe is a little bit better off than, for example, the Asian allies because we have two nuclear powers in Europe that have their own arsenals. France and the UK see that there is a need in Europe for better coordination in this regard, and this may help reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, at least in Europe. This is a really important step that they're taking.

PW: The other slightly longer-standing case of cooperation in Europe in a post-Trump universe is the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” which would maybe someday provide air cover in Ukraine, or troops in Ukraine, or logistical support to replace a reduction in American support. How's that going?

Ålander: There was another very interesting news item yesterday about this “Coalition of the Willing”, namely, that it will get a NATO-style, permanent, rotational headquarters, which is quite a big step to start institutionalizing this coalition. Headquarters will be for the first 12 months located in Paris, and then it will rotate to London. It's going to be headed by a 3-star general. I think that there is some interesting potential in this coalition because it is essentially circumventing all the problems that we have with regards to supporting Ukraine. Hungary is not in on this coalition, so that removes one obstacle that is always there in the EU context.

This coalition was set up in response to the US demand that Europeans take more responsibility for [Ukraine]. The US originally wasn't part of the coalition, but yesterday, for the first time, they sent representatives to this “Coalition of the Willing” meeting. I take it as a potential sign that the US sees that this is turning into something more serious, and that by not participating, the US loses leverage over both Ukraine and this coalition. There are 30-plus countries in this coalition and once you have established this kind of a forum, it's easier to add other items onto the agenda as needed.

We have to start thinking about what the future European security architecture looks like. A lot depends on NATO's ability to stay functional with this US administration. If NATO is becoming more and more dysfunctional, depending on how the coming three and a half years go with this administration and whatever comes after it, this can become an avenue to bypass institutions that are not fit for purpose anymore. I think the coalition has significant potential. Obviously the force is not going to be deployed to Ukraine next week. But nevertheless, there is a whole organization behind this now. That is very significant in terms of thinking how Europe is going about its security with or without the US.

PW: It's interesting in that it's clearly not NATO, because Ukraine is in it and Hungary isn't. It's clearly not the European Union, because the headquarters is shared between Britain and France. It does seem susceptible to a certain level of paralysis-by-analysis, though. I mean, if I look at the most significant developments in the Ukraine war this year it would include Russia bombing the hell out of civilian targets in Ukraine this month. And Ukraine launched a drone strike against the Russian bomber capacity last month. That was one of the most audacious military moves anyone's ever seen. Meanwhile, this “Coalition of the Willing” has settled where its headquarters is going to be. If I'm feeling uncharitable, that seems almost satirical. It doesn't seem to be “willing” to do much yet.

Ålander: Yeah, you're really hitting the spot there. As far as I know, the coalition has had operational plans for deployment for some months now. There have been multiple issues with European availability capacity, and also Ukraine's needs. The point is that the operational capacity can be arranged, and military planners have been at this quite intensively and quite seriously since January or February. The hitch is really on the political level – the politics haven't really gotten to a point where a deployment decision would have been made.

I think that we may be getting closer to the point where it will have to be made, ceasefire or not, because the rate at which Russia has intensified its air attacks is just unsustainable. It's putting Ukraine into a really difficult position, and we will see what the Trump administration is going to do now. I doubt that they will significantly change their course, but Ukraine may get a little something right now that helps a little bit. Many of these European efforts are good in the sense that they are relevant for the long term. They include mechanisms on how to integrate Ukraine into Europe and the European Union membership and how to practically circumvent current roadblocks.

Europeans have tried both the flattery strategy with Trump and sort of playing dead, or trying to make sure that they don't rock the boat more than is necessary, because it is hard for Europe alone to come up with the short-term answer to these problems. I think one game changer might be once Ukraine gets its own anti-drone innovations onto the battlefield. I understand that there's been some delays in the production and in the development, but a lot actually depends on Ukraine itself right now. Ukraine has really impressively stepped up its own industrial output.

PW: In the middle of all of this, Mark Rutte, the new Secretary General, gives this amazing interview to the New York Times, where he says that Donald Trump is the driver of just about everything good that's been happening in NATO over the last several months. What do you make of that interview?

Ålander: I believe that the reason [he gave that interview] was because of his “Daddy” comment at the NATO summit. He called Trump “Daddy,” which caught the attention of the world and required some explanation. Obviously, NATO’s Secretary General is the last person on this earth who would ever criticize the President of the United States. But then, of course, you can also wonder whether it needs to go so far in the opposite direction, and that this flattery is becoming quite tasteless.

Rutte was right about a couple things, though. European countries would probably never have en masse signed up for this spending goal had it not been for Donald Trump. I think that's probably a true statement. Whether it's a good or a bad thing is a different question. But it’s probably true.

The interview was interesting for many reasons, and I think that what Rutte said about Trump was the least interesting part of it because it was so predictable. There was nothing surprising in what he said. His nickname in the Netherlands and in Europe is “Teflon Mark”, because he is so smooth and sort of immune to criticism and so opportunistic as a politician. In the interview he literally said that he was the Prime Minister of the Netherlands for 14 years, so he knows what criticism is, but he doesn’t care. I think that’s probably the reason why Europeans wanted him to be the man to deal with Trump.

To get back to the interview, though, there were many elements in it that were more interesting than what he said about Trump. He said out loud that he knows that Russians read these interviews. And he said some interesting things about how he would expect that if China wanted to go for Taiwan, they would ask Russia to [attack Europe as a diversion.] I don't think that it has been communicated so openly on that level before.

PW: Is the presence of a new Canadian Prime Minister noticed in all of these considerations? As far as you can tell, is Canada presenting a different face and a different policy than it was a year ago?

Ålander: I don't think that we necessarily perceive a huge difference yet, but I think it was interesting that the Canadian election took place right after Trump came to power, and it seemed that the election was also shaped quite a lot by Trump's policy toward Canada. It has been well perceived in Europe that Carney has definitely said a lot of interesting things and has not been meek about the US threats towards Canada. And, of course, also this kind of revival of even some sort of Canadian patriotism. That has made the news in Europe.

I think that Trudeau was such a visible figure for such a long time, that it's going to take a bit of time, and maybe some even bigger and bolder moves by Canada to really make an impression. I think that there's a lot of potential right now in the transatlantic relationship between Canada and Europe and that should absolutely be harnessed. Canada's issues are very similar to European countries right now. And like Europeans, Canada is in danger of spending money on the wrong things and doing it in an inefficient way.

I believe that there's a lot of goodwill towards Canada in Europe right now. But it's also up to Canada to make sure that it gets in on all the developments. Canada needs to be proactive here. I would really welcome seeing Canada more actively participating in exercises in Northern Finland. There are ways to increase the interoperability in this Northern Atlantic or Northern Transatlantic relationship that we should really look into much more. Greenland is very close to Canada and it's this natural link to Europe. Denmark is now increasing its presence in Greenland. There's a lot of potential for Canada to work with Denmark, and so on. We in Europe need to make sure that we don't forget Canada. And Canada needs to make sure that we can't forget it.